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L Introduction
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
(Title 111)1 regulates wire and oral interceptions made by both private
* The author would like to express his appreciation to Professor L.H. LaRue,
Professor Scott E. Sundby, and M. Annette Lanning for their assistance in the development
of this Note.
1. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802,
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individuals and government agents.' Essentially, Title III prohibits all
wiretapping and the disclosure of information intercepted by wiretapping
except that which is specifically authorized or exempted by the statute.

82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994)).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994). An "interception" occurs under Title I upon "the aural
or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through
the use of any electromc, mechanical, or other device." Id. § 2510(4). "'Wire communication' means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between
the point of origin and the point of reception
" Id. § 2510(1). "'Oral communication'
means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation,
but such term does not include any electronic communication." Id. § 2510(2). Under the
1986 amendments to Title IH, interceptions of "electronic communications" are also
prohibited. Id. § 2511(1)(a). With a few exceptions, "'electronic surveillance' means any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted
by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical system
that affects interstate or foreign commerce." Id. § 2510(12).
3. See id. § 2511(1). Section 2511(1) states:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who (a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication;
(b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to
use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to
intercept any oral communication
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having
reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception
of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection;
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any wire, oral
or electric communication, knowing or having reason to know that the
information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or
electronic communication in violation of this subsection;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as
provided in subsection (5).
Id., see also infra note 27 (enumerating exceptions to § 2511(1)'s general ban on wiretapping). For the two most important exceptions to Title III, see infra notes 28-29 and
accompanying text. For discussions detailing the structure and organization of Title iH,see
Thomas W Jerry, Note, The End of the Line? In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence: Limiting Private Civil RICO Litigants' Access to Government Wiretaps, 38
ST. Louis U. L.J. 769, 776-78 (1994) and Thomas M. Smith, Comment, The Suppression
Sanction Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act for Violations of the Private
One-Party Consent Exception, 34 VILL. L. REv 111, 118-29 (1989).
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Section 2515 operates as an enforcement mechanism for the statute and

suppresses the contents of any communication intercepted in violation of
4
Title Iii.
Despite the expressly comprehensive scope of § 2515, however,

courts have developed exceptions to Title IH's suppression provision.5
Recently, a new exception to § 2515 suppression has caused a split in the
courts of appeals. The Courts of Appeals for the First and Sixth Circuits

differ on whether courts may, in criminal prosecutions, receive illegally
intercepted communications in evidence when the government is the inno-

cent recipient of such communications. 6" The Sixth Circuit refers to this
new exception to § 2515 as the "clean hands" exception. 7 This Note
addresses the legitimacy of this newfound exception. Part II summarizes
the legislative history of the pertinent Title 1H provisions. 8 Part III explains
the clean hands exception.9 Part IV critiques the reasoning of the Sixth
0 Part V analyzes the deterCircuit's decision in United States v. Murdock."
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2515. Section 2515 states in full:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be
received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any
court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of [Title m].
Id. For the procedure by which the suppression provision is invoked, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(10)(a). Section 2518(10)(a) provides in relevant part that "[a]ny aggrieved person
may move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted pursuant
to this chapter or evidence derived therefrom" if the communication is made in violation of
Title . Id. "'[A]ggrieved person' means a person who was a party to any intercepted
wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was
directed." Id. § 2510(11).
5. See United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 112 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that
perpetrators of illegal interception could not benefit from suppression protection); United
States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1973) (concluding that illegally intercepted
communications could be used for impeachment purposes); see also infra notes 112-33 and
accompanying text (discussing Underhill decision); infra note 44 and accompanying text
(examining Caron decision).
6. Compare United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1404 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming creation of "clean hands" exception to Title I suppression), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct.
1672 (1996) with United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 483 (lst Cir. 1987) (refusing to
embrace clean hands exception to Title ll suppression).
7. Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1404.
8. See infra notes 13-46 and accompanying text (summarizing legislative history of
pertinent Title Ell provisions).
9. See infra notes 47-73 and accompanying text (explaining clean hands exception
espoused in Murdock).
10. See infra notes 74-235 and accompanying text (critiquing reasoning of Sixth
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rence-based argument in favor of the clean hands exception."

Part VI

concludes that the Sixth Circuit erred in adopting a clean hands exception
12
to Title III's exclusionary rule.
1H. A Summary of Title III's Legislative History
Prior to Title III, the severely criticized 3 Federal Communications Act
of 1934 (FCA) governed the use of electronic surveillance. 4 Under the
FCA, private persons could ignore the statute's restrictions because the
restrictions only applied to governmental interceptions. s However, law

enforcement agents could not employ electronic surveillance to investigate
and prosecute even the most serious of crimes.' 6 In addition to these
statutory limitations, the Supreme Court, through its decisions in Katz v.
United States 7 and Berger v. New York,' 8 also created restrictions on the
use of electronic surveillance.
Circuit's decision in Murdock).
11. See infra notes 236-87 and accompanying text (analyzing deterrence-based
argument in favor of clean hands exception).
12. See infra notes 287-95 and accompanying text (concluding that Sixth Circuit erred
in adopting clean hands exception to Title ml's exclusionary rule).
13. See 1 JAMES G. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 2.1 (2d ed.
1986) (explaining that FCA was "worst of all possible solutions" to wiretapping problem).
14. 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (West 1962 & Supp. 1988) (amended by Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968))
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994)) (inserting in introductory clause "[e]xcept as
authorized by [Title 111]"). The FCA provides in part that:
No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or transmitting, or assisting in
transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall divulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning thereof
except through authorized channels of transmission or reception.
Id. After the enactment of Title I, Section 605 of the FCA was amended to supply all of
the necessary restrictions on the interception of wire and oral communications not referenced
in Title ITm.Id. For a discussion detailing the legislative history of Title III as well as the
developments in the area of electronic surveillance prior to Title mH, see 1 CARR, supra note
13, §§ 1.1-2.5. See also Jerry, supra note 3, at 776-78 (discussing Title m's legislative
history); Smith, supra note 3, at 118-29 (same).
15. See 1 CARR, supra note 13, § 2.1.
16. Id. Title III remedied the FCA's flaw of not permitting law enforcement agents'
use of electronic surveillance in the investigation of serious crimes by specifically identifying
which crimes were subject to surveillance. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1994) (enumerating
exclusive list of crimes that law enforcement officers may investigate with Title llI surveillance).
17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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In Katz, the Supreme Court held that agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) violated the Fourth Amendment when they failed to
obtain a warrant before using an electronic listening and recording device
to intercept telephone calls made from a public telephone booth.19 The Katz
Court abandoned the traditional rule that Fourth Amendment violations only
occur upon the government's physical trespass into a constitutionally
protected area and concluded that, regardless of the individual's location,

the Fourth Amendment protects the individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy against unauthorized government intrusion.'0
In Berger, the Supreme Court struck down New York's extremely
permissive electronic surveillance statute."' The statute under review did
19. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that use of listening
and recording device attached to outside of public telephone booth requires warrant). In
Katz, the Supreme Court considered whether the use of a listening and recording device
attached to the outside of a public telephone booth constituted a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 349-53. FBI agents recorded the petitioner's telephone
conversations by affixing a recording device to the outside of a public telephone booth from
which the petitioner placed calls. Id. at 348. The FBI agents believed that the petitioner
was using the public telephone to transmit gambling information. Id. at 359. The telephone
recordings led to the petitioner's conviction of transmitting wagering information by telephone across state lines in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084. Id. The Katz Court concluded
that the FBI's interception constituted a Fourth Amendment search. Id. at 353. In reaching
this decision, the Supreme Court revolutionized Fourth Amendment thinking. According
to the Katz Court, an individual's right to Fourth Amendment protection does not turn on
the presence or absence of a physical trespass into a particular area. Id. Instead, Fourth
Amendment protection depends upon an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. Id.
As the Court explained, the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places." Id. at 351.
Therefore, the Katz Court reasoned that the right to Fourth Amendment protection follows
the individual into areas accessible by the public. Id. Applying these principles, the Katz
Court decided that the petitioner possessed a justified expectation that his conversations
behind the closed door of the public telephone booth would not be subject to unauthorized
government intrusion. Id. at 352-53. Consequently, the Katz Court held that the FBI agents
violated the Fourth Amendment by not obtaining a warrant before using the listening and
recording device to intercept the petitioner's telephone calls. Id. at 359.
20. Id. at 352-53.
21. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967) (holding that New York's
electronic surveillance statute violated Fourth Amendment). In Berger, the Supreme Court
considered whether New York's permissive eavesdropping statute violated the Fourth
Amendment as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 43-44. New York
state investigators received complaints that the New York State Liquor Authority was
accepting bribes for liquor licenses. Id. at 44. In response to this and other complaints,
New York authorities sent an undercover agent, wired with a recording device, to the
Liquor Authority. Id. An employee informed the agent that the cost of a liquor license was
$10,000 and told the agent to contact the employer's attorney, Harry Neyer. Id. During
a later conversation, Neyer confirmed the price for the license. Id. Based on the conversations recorded by the agent, New York authorities obtained authorization to install a
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not require state law enforcement agents to restrict their wire surveillance
to conversations relevant to the alleged criminal activity.' The Berger
Court concluded that the New York statute violated the particularity re-

quirement of the Fourth Amendment because it authorized law enforcement
agents to use electronic surveillance indiscriminately.' Thus, after Berger
and Katz, to satisfy constitutional scrutiny the government's use of a wire-

tap had to be authorized by warrant, and the warrant had to order the
agents to restrict their wire interceptions to specific conversations.

In response to the FCA's inherent deficiencies and to the Berger and
Katz decisions, Congress passed Title HLI.2 Generally, Title III serves two
purposes: the need to protect individual privacy by prohibiting unwarranted
recording device in Neyer's office. Id. at 45. The recording device revealed that petitioner
Berger was part of a conspiracy involving the issuance of liquor licenses to two New York
City clubs. Id. Berger argued that the recordings should be suppressed because the statute
that authorized the state to implant the recording device violated the Fourth Amendment.
Id. The Supreme Court agreed with Berger and held that the New York statute violated the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 58-60. The Court initially concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects individuals against state violations of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
53. The Court then held that the New York statute violated the particularity requirement
of the Fourth Amendment because it authorized the indiscriminate use of electronic recording devices by law enforcement personnel. Id. at 58-60. The statute did not require the
agents to restrict their listening and recording to conversations relevant to the crime that the
agents were investigating. Id. at 59. Thus, the statute essentially authorized state agents
to engage in a "general search" of all conversations in Neyer's office. Id. As the Berger
Court explained, the Fourth Amendment forbids general searches. Id. at 49-50.
22. Id. at 59.
23. Id. at 58-60. Title I attempts to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity
requirement in § 2518(5). 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1994). This provision provides in relevant
part that "[e]very order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization
to intercept . . . shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception under [Title 111]." Id.
24. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, § 802,
82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994)) (authorizing law
enforcement agents to employ wiretaps only in certain criminal investigations and generally
prohibiting private wire interceptions); see also Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2177 (indicating that Title 1I1
was response to deficiencies in then existing law). Section 801(b) of Title
III
states that:
[T]o protect the privacy of wire and oral communication, to protect the integrity
of court and administrative proceedings and to prevent the obstruction of interstate
commerce, it is necessary for Congress to define on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communication may be authorized.
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, § 801(b), 82 Stat.
197, 211 (1968).
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electronic communication interceptions' and the need to equip law enforcement officials with a weapon necessary to battle organized crime.-6 In
balancing these competing interests, Congress created a general ban on the

interception of communications, with two major exceptions. 27 First, a court
may authorize law enforcement agents to intercept certain communications.2" Second, a private individual may intercept a communication to
which he is a party as long as the interception is not for an "unlawful" or
"tortious" purpose.

9

To enforce Title lI's general prohibition and to

25. See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 2153-58 (describing Title I goals of privacy
protection and law enforcement); see also Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 47-50
(1972) (stating that protection of privacy overrode congressional concern in enacting Title
M); Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 675, 678 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Gelbard, 408 U.S. at
48) (same); United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 481 (1st Cir. 1987) (concluding that
privacy was major concern in enactment of Title I); United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d
105, 112 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that Congress did not intend to protect individuals who
recorded their own conversations); United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, 324 (8th Cir.
1976) (concluding that Title I was intended to balance need to protect individuals from
intrusive electronic surveillance with need to preserve law enforcement tools to fight
organized crime); United States v. Traficant, 558 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (N.D. Ohio 1983)
(indicating that Title iI's legislative history shows intent to create balance between protection of privacy and equipping law enforcement officials with modern technology).
26. S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 2177. Section 801(c) of Title III "recognizes the
extensive use made by organized crime of wire and oral communications." Id. Section
801(c) also acknowledges that "the ability to intercept such communications is indispensable
in the evidence gathering process in the administration of justice in the area of organized
crime." Id.
27. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(d), 2516 (excepting authorized governmental interceptions and private interceptions when private interceptor is party to intercepted communication). Additional exceptions to Title ImI include: (1) a communication carrier intercepting
communications in the normal course of employment, id. § 2511(2)(a); (2) an agent of,the
Federal Communications Commission intercepting a communication in the normal course
of employment, id. § 2511(2)(b); (3) a person acting under color of law intercepting a
communication if he is a party to the communication and has given his prior consent, id.
§ 2511(2)(c); (4) the acquisition of foreign intelligence information, which is governed by
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, id. § 2511(2)(f); (5) the interception of
electronic communications that are readily accessible to the general public, id. § 2511(2)(g);
and (6) the use of a pen register or a trap and trace device, id. § 2511(2)(h).
28. See id. § 2511(2)(e). Section 2511(2)(e) exempts "an officer, employee or agent
of the United States in the normal course of his official duty to conduct electronic surveillance." Id. Section 2516 enumerates the exclusive list of offenses that electronic interception may be used to combat. Id. § 2516.
29. Id. § 2511(2)(d). Section 2511(2)(d) allows for a private one-party consent exception and states:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of
law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a
party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has
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ensure that clandestine surveillance is confined to the situations carved out
by the statute, Congress criminalized the use of wire and oral communica-

tion interception by both private individuals and law enforcement agents in
all circumstances that do not fit within a statutory exception," and made
such surveillance proper ground for a civil suit." In addition, Congress
32
included § 2515, a suppression provision, to ensure further compliance.
According to § 2515's plain language, the scope of the suppression provi-

sion extends to all violations of Title III, including violations perpetrated by
private individuals."

Although Title I suppression extends to private violations, the legislative history of § 2515 states that Congress did not intend to expand the

scope of the suppression provision beyond then existing search and seizure
law. 34 At the time Congress enacted Title III, the exclusionary rule for
given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for
the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States or of any state.
Id.
30. Id. § 2511.
31. Id. § 2520. Title M provides for recovery of civil damages for any person whose
"wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in
violation of [Title M]." Id. § 2520(a). Section 2520 further provides liquidated damages
in the event actual damages cannot be shown. Id. § 2520(c). To recover under § 2520, the
plaintiff must prove a violation of § 2511. Id. § 2511. Section 2511 prohibits an individual
from intentionally intercepting or attempting to intercept wire or oral communications or
intentionally disclosing or using the contents of wire or oral communications that the
individual knows were procured in violation of Title III. Id. See generally Note, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance - Tide III of the Crime Control Act of 1968, 23 RUTGERS
L. REV. 319 (1969) (providing comprehensive discussion of Title Ill as originally enacted).
For a discussion of private actions under Title m, see Bradford Frost Englander, Fourth
CircuitReview: Statutes of Limitations and Private Actions Under Title In of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 493, 614-24 (1984).
Additionally, Title III provides criminal penalties for those who violate the provisions of
§ 2511. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4) (1994).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2515; see supra note 4 (providing full text of § 2515).
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (suppressing any interception ifitsdisclosure would violate
Title 1P); id. § 2511(1)(c) (prohibiting any disclosure of information ifdiscloser knew or
should have known that interceptor obtained information in violation of Title M); id.
§ 2511(1)(a) (prohibiting all private party interceptions except those exempted in statute);
see also supra note 3 (providing full text of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)). Because § 2511(1)(c)
makes it a Title Ill violation to disclose information obtained in violation of Title I,
§ 2515, by suppressing all interceptions the disclosure of which violates Title m, essentially
operates to suppress all information obtained in violation of Title III.
34. See S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2185.
This portion of Title M's legislative history states:
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Fourth Amendment violations operated to exclude unlawful governmental

searches only." According to the Supreme Court in 1968 and according to
the Court now, private searches simply do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.3 Nevertheless, because Title II prohibits private interceptions and
because the plain language of § 2515 requires the suppression of all inter-

ceptions obtained in violation of Title 11,, 3 the suppression provision must
necessarily operate to exclude evidence otherwise admissible under Fourth
Amendment exclusionary jurisprudence."

Therefore, the plain language of

§ 2515 appears to conflict with its legislative history.
Given this inconsistency, it is not surprising that the scope of § 2515

suppression commonly arises as an issue in federal courts.39 Questions
primarily develop because the provision's overly broad language would, if

taken literally, preclude the prosecution from introducing an illegal recording or any evidence obtained through the use of an illegal recording against
[Section 2515] must, of course, be read in light of [S]ection 2518. . . which defines
the class entitled to make a motion to suppress. It largely reflects existing law. It
applies to suppress evidence directly or indirectly obtained in violation of the chapter.
There is, however, no intention to change the attenuation rule. . . . Nor generally
to press the scope of the suppression role beyond present search and seizure law.
Id. (citations omitted).
35. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921) (holding that Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule limits government only and, therefore, evidence obtained by
private illegal search need not be excluded from trial); see also infra notes 187-218 and
accompanying text (discussing relationship between Fourth Amendment and private
searches).
36. See Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 476 (concluding that Fourth Amendment does not
protect individual against private search).
37. See supra note 33 (explaining why § 2515 essentially suppresses all interceptions
obtained in violation of Title M).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1994); see supra note 4 (providing full text of § 2515).
39. See, e.g., Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 47 (1972) (holding that grand
jury witnesses are entitled to invoke Title M's suppression provision in defending contempt
charges brought against them for refusing to testify); United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d
1391, 1404 (6th Cir. 1995) (refusing to suppress illegally intercepted communication under
§ 2515 because government was innocent recipient of evidence), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1672 (1996); United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 484 (1st Cir. 1987) (suppressing illegally
intercepted communication under § 2515 despite fact that government was innocent recipient
of evidence); United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 112 (6th Cir. 1987) (refusing to
suppress illegally intercepted evidence when movant was perpetrator of illegal interception);
Anthony v. United States, 667 F.2d 870, 880 (10th Cir. 1981) (concluding that defendant
charged with illegal wiretapping is precluded from using information derived from illegally
intercepted communications to impeach government witness); United States v. Caron, 474
F.2d 506, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1973) (allowing prosecution to use illegally intercepted information for impeachment purposes).
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any "aggrieved person" for any purpose. 4' The plain language of the"
operative sections indicates that this broad interpretation of § 2515's scope
would preclude the use of an illegal recording against its maker. 4' Notwith-

standing the plain statutory language, courts have in certain circumstances
utilized § 2515's legislative history to allow the introduction of recordings
that § 2515 otherwise would suppress. 2 In United States v. Caron,43 the
Fifth Circuit concluded that illegally intercepted communications could be
introduced into evidence for impeachment purposes. 44 In United States v.
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (suppressing all interceptions obtained in violation of
statute).
41. Id.; see also United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 108 (6th Cir. 1987)
(concluding that § 2515's language technically required suppression even though defendant
had perpetrated interception for unlawful purpose).
42. See Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112 (stating that perpetrators of illegal interception
could not benefit from suppression protection); United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506, 509
(5th Cir. 1973) (concluding that illegally intercepted coimmunications could be used for
impeachment purposes).
43. 474 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1973).
44. See Caron, 474 F.2d at 509-10 (concluding that Government could use intercepted
tape recordings for impeachment purposes without proving that agents legally obtained
recordings). In Caron, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the Government could use
evidence that had been obtained by a wiretap for impeachment purposes without a prior
determination by the trial court that the wiretap was lawful. Id. at 507. The United States
charged Caron with two counts of perjury based upon Caron's denial of any previous
bookmaking activity and Caron's denial of any relationship with Howard Gardner during
federal grand jury proceedings. Id. After the prosecution's case in chief, Caron took the
stand as the sole witness for the defense and admitted that he had made a mistake when
questioned before the grand jury because he did in fact know Howard Gardner. Id. However, Caron continued to deny that he had engaged in any bookmaking activity. Id. at 508.
During rebuttal, the Government sought to challenge Caron's credibility by offering several
intercepted telephone conversations in which Caron discussed bookmaking activities. Id. The
district court allowed the Government to use the tapes for impeachment purposes without a
prior evidentiary hearing on the lawfulness of the Government's interception. Id. The jury
found defendant guilty on both counts of perjury. Id. Defendant appealed to the Fifth Circuit
on the basis that the district court committed reversible error by failing to determine the
validity of the tapes before permitting prosecutors to use them for impeachment purposes.
Id, On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Id. at 510. The court
of appeals relied primarily upon the Supreme Court's decision in Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62 (1954). In Walder, the Supreme Court reasoned that a defendant could not use the
government's illegal method of obtaining evidence to shield himself "against contradiction of
his untruths." Walder, 347 U.S. at 65. The Fifth Circuit then concluded that Title I's
legislative history did not reflect congressional intent for the suppression provision to exceed
the scope of present day search and seizure law. Caron, 474 F.2d at 510. Using this
interpretation of Title ll's legislative history along with Walder, the Fifth Circuit reasoned
that even if the district court had concluded that the government illegally intercepted Caron's
conversations, Title III did not require suppression of the interceptions. Id. Consequently,
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Underhill,4' the Sixth Circuit concluded that those who violate Title I by
illegally intercepting communications cannot shield themselves from criminally incriminating information within the intercepted communications by
invoking the protection of § 2515.1 Part III of this Note introduces a new
exception to Title Hm's suppression provision.
II. The Clean Hands Exception
In United States v. Murdock,47 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit embraced the concept of a clean hands exception for the
government's use of illegally intercepted wire or oral communications in
criminal prosecutions when a state prosecutor is the innocent recipient of
such information.' Harold D. Murdock, while serving as President of the
Detroit School Board, became involved in a divorce action with his wife.49
Mr. and Mrs. Murdock owned and operated a funeral home next to their
residence.5' Convinced that Mr. Murdock was engaged in inappropriate
personal and business conduct, Mrs. Murdock recorded telephone calls to
and from the funeral home on the business extension phones in her home.'1
After reviewing a particular recording some time later, Mrs. Murdock
discovered that a local dairy company had bribed her husband in his capacity as President of the Detroit School Board.52 Mrs. Murdock disclosed this
information to the competing dairy company that had lost the milk
contract.53 The dairy company that lost the contract delivered the information to the local state prosecutor's office and a newspaper. 4 As a result of
the newspaper's story, federal agents began an investigation that culminated
in Mr. Murdock's federal indictment on tax evasion charges for failure to
report the bribe as income.5' Before trial, Mr. Murdock urged the court to
dismiss the indictment or, in the alternative, to suppress the recorded
the court of appeals upheld Caron's conviction. Id.
45. 813 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1986).
46. See infra notes 112-33 (detailing facts and holding of Underhill).
47. 63 F.3d 1391 (6th Cir. 1995).
48. See United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1404 (6th Cir. 1995) (creating clean
hands exception for prosecution's use of innocently received illegal interceptions), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1672 (1996).
49. Id. at 1392.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.at 1393.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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communications pursuant to the suppression provision of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2515.56 The district court overruled Mr. Murdock's motion and found
that the tape-recorded conversations fell within the telephone or business
extension exemption of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(i) or, alternatively, that
§ 2515 suppression did not limit the prosecutor's use of illegally intercepted
the prosecutor played no part in the interception of
communications 5when
7
the conversation.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the
district court's decision. 8 First, the court of appeals determined that
§ 2510(5)(a)(i) did not exempt Mrs. Murdock's recording. 9 The court then
found a violation under § 2511. 0 Having found a violation under § 2511,
the Murdock court was forced to consider the application of § 2515, Title
III's suppression provision. The Murdock court first acknowledged the
First Circuit's decision in United States v. Vest 6 and then summarily
dismissed it.62 Eight years earlier, the Vest court had expressly denied the
application of a governmental clean hands exception in Title III cases.'
Second, the Murdock court turned to United States v. Underhil1' to support the proposition that the suppression provision of § 2515 does not
absolutely exclude all illegally intercepted communications.' 5 In Underhill,
the Sixth Circuit held that the perpetrator of a Title III violation could not
employ Title III's exclusionary provisions to protect himself against criminally incriminating information within the illegally intercepted commumication. 66
Next, the Murdock court looked to United States v. Baranek67 to
further support its decision.68 In Baranek, the Sixth Circuit refused to
suppress a recorded conversation that was obtained when officers, while
executing an authorized wiretap of a telephone, recorded an extended
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.; see supra note 4 (providing full text of § 2515).
Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1393.
Id. at 1404.
Id. at 1400.
Id.
813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987).
Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1400-01.
United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 481 (1st Cir. 1987).
813 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1987).
Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1402.
United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 111-12 (6th Cir. 1987).
903 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1990).
See Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1402.
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nontelephonic conversation over the tapped line while the telephone receiver
was inadvertently left off the hook. 9 The Murdock court employed the
language of the Baranek court and reasoned that, like the officers in
Baranek, the federal agents in Murdock simply got a "lucky break."70 The
Murdock court also analogized to Fourth Amendment exclusionary jurisprudence.71 Specifically, the Murdock court stated that "[ilt is well established
that evidence obtained by a private search is not subject to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule."7 Using this Fourth Amendment principle,
the Murdock court reasoned that because a private party with no connection
to the prosecuting authority carried out the unlawful interception, the prosecutors had clean hands as the innocent recipient of such information and
could legitimately use against Mr. Murdock the information illegally
recorded by Mrs. Murdock.73
IV. A Critique of United States v. Murdock
A. Murdock's Attack of Vest
The Sixth Circuit was not the first court of appeals to consider the
clean hands exception to Title m. Eight years earlier in United States v.
Vest,74 the First Circuit examined the issue and expressly rejected any
notion of a governmental clean hands exception for innocently received
illegal interceptions.75 In United States v. Murdock, the Sixth Circuit began
its analysis of § 2515 by criticizing the reasoning of the First Circuit's
decision in United States v. Vest.76
1. United States v. Vest
In Vest, the Government charged George H. Vest with perjury and
attempted to introduce illegally recorded statements that incriminated Vest. 7
Originally, Jesse James Waters was charged with the shooting of a Boston
69. United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 1990); see infra notes
140-70 and accompanying text (discussing Baranekfacts and holding).
70. Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1402 (quoting Baranek, 903 F.2d at 1072).
71. Id. at 1403.
72. Id. (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)).
73. Id. at 1404.
74. 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987).
75. United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 484 (1st Cir. 1987).
76. United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1400 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1672 (1996).
77. Vest, 813 F.2d at 479.
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police detective." Waters bribed an employee at the Boston police department in an effort to avoid imprisonment. 79 Vest agreed to serve as the conduit for the payments between Waters and the employee. 0 When delivering
a particular payment to Vest, Waters electronically recorded the transaction
and accompanying discussion without Vest's knowledge.81 After his conviction and sentencing, Waters delivered the tape recording to the prosecutors.' While testifying before a grand jury, Vest denied that the voice on
the tape recording was his own.' As a result, the United States prosecuted
Vest for perjury.'
Because Waters allegedly recorded Vest's statements in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a) and 2511(2)(d),' Vest moved to suppress the recording pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2515.86 The district court granted Vest's
motion.' On appeal, the Government argued that the First Circuit should
adopt a clean hands exception to § 2515.88 Specifically, the United States
argued that § 2515 suppression does not apply when the government is
merely the innocent recipient, rather than the procurer, of an illegally intercepted communication.89 To support its position, the United States argued
that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule under § 2515 is to deter
violations of Title IYI Accordingly, the prosecution claimed that suppressing the interception would serve no deterrent purpose because the government had not carried out the illegal interception of Vest's statement. 91
2. Vest's Reliance on United States v. Gelbard
In reaching its decision in Vest, the First Circuit relied on the findings
of legislative intent in Gelbard v. United States' and, as a result, rejected
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 480.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id."
408 U.S. 41 (1972).
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the Government's deterrence theory and refused to admit the illegal recording.93 The Gelbard Court denied the Government the ability to use information obtained from an illegal wiretap when cross-examining a grand jury
witness. 4 For the Gelbard Court, the overriding legislative intent within
Title III was the protection of privacy.95 Most importantly, the Court
reasoned that an invasion of privacy does not cease upon the conclusion of
an illegal interception, but continues with each subsequent disclosure.96
The Vest court adopted Gelbard'sunderstanding of the role of privacy
protection in § 2515 problems.' The First Circuit then decided that the
invasion of privacy that occurred through the disclosure of illegally intercepted communications was "not lessened by the circumstance that the disclosing party ... [was] merely the innocent recipient of a communication
93. United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 481 (1st Cir. 1987).
94. See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 47 (1972) (holding that § 2515
operates to suppress illegally intercepted communications when such information is used
to cross-examine grand jury witnesses). In Gelbard, the Supreme Court considered
whether grand jury witnesses, in proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a), were entitled
to invoke Title I's suppression provision as a defense to contempt charges brought
against them for refusing to testify. Id. at 43. In Gelbard, the petitioners refused to
testify in certain grand jury proceedings because illegal interceptions of their conversations
formed the basis of the Government's examination. Id. As a result of their refusal to
testify, the petitioners were charged with civil contempt. Id. According to the Gelbard
Court, the petitioners were victims of illegal governmental interceptions, and therefore,
the disclosure of the contents of interceptions would be a violation of Title III under
§ 2511(1). Id. at 47. The Government intended to use this illegally intercepted information when questioning the petitioners before the grand jury. Id. at 45. In reaching its
decision, the GelbardCourt first explained that under 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a), an individual
who has "just cause" is immune from civil contempt charges for refusing to testify before
a grand jury. Id. Accordingly, the Court addressed whether 18 U.S.C. § 2515, which
suppresses information obtained in violation of Title III, can operate to provide "just
cause" for the petitioners' refusal to testify. Id. For the Supreme Court, privacy protection was an "overriding congressional concern" in enacting Title mII.Id. at 48. The
Court reasoned that the invasion of privacy that Title I seeks to prohibit does not only
occur during the unauthorized interception itself, but also continues when the interception
is subsequently disclosed. Id. at 51-52. Following this reasoning, the Supreme Court
concluded that grand jury questioning based on the illegally intercepted communication
further invaded the petitioners' privacy beyond the original illegal interception. Id. at 47.
Because Congress intended for § 2515 to limit such continuous invasions of privacy, the
Court held that petitioners could "invoke the prohibition of § 2515 as a defense to
contempt charges brought on the basis of their refusal to obey court orders to testify."
Id.; see also supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (describing Title III's goal of
protecting privacy).
95. Gelbard, 408 U.S. at 48.
96. Id. at 51-52.
97. Vest, 813 F.2d at 481.
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illegally intercepted by the guilty interceptor." 98 For the Vest court, this
invasion of privacy was sufficient to warrant suppression under § 2515. 9
3. A Critiqueof Murdock's Discussionof Vest
The Murdock court contended that the Vest court misread and misapplied the Gelbard decision and, as a result, wrongly decided Vest.10

Although the Vest court would apply Gelbard'srationale in settings involving both private and governmental conduct, the Murdock court suggested
that the scope of Gelbard is limited to governmental action.10' This narrow

reading of Gelbardby the Murdock court is countered both by Gelbard's
reasoning and the legislative history upon which Gelbard is based."m
According to the GelbardCourt, the harm of the illegal interception - the

invasion of privacy - does not depend upon the nature of the interceptor.'"
As Vest emphasized, the Gelbard Court concluded that the invasion of
privacy that § 2515 is designed to prohibit is not over when an interception

occurs. 14 Rather, the invasion continues and is compounded by disclosure
in court or elsewhere.0 5 The impact of the subsequent disclosure is not
mitigated by the fact that a party different from the original interceptor is
98. Id.
99. Id. at 484.
100. United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1401 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1672 (1996).
101. See id. (stating that "point of Gelbard was that ifthe government was eventually
shown to have illegally intercepted the conversations, then the witness was entitled to
[exclusion under Title IQ]"). The Murdock court reasoned:
The Gelbard Court's discussion of the legislative history of Section 2515, read in
context of the facts of the case, emphasized not that individuals are just generally
entitled to have their privacy protected, but that they are specifically entitled to
protection from unscrupulous law enforcement procedures which invade their
privacy. The point of Gelbardwas that ifthe Government was eventually shown
to have illegally intercepted the conversations, then the witness was entitled under
Title IIl to have that evidence suppressed and completely excluded from any line
of questioning, including a grand jury proceeding. To cite Gelbardas standing for
the proposition that the entire purpose of Title M is to prevent victimization in the
form of invasion of privacy goes too far.
Id.
102. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (discussing Title Il's goal of
protecting privacy).
103. See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 (1972) (explaining that importance
of § 2515 lies in protection against unlawful invasions of privacy).
104. United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 481 (lst Cir. 1987).
105. Id.
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the one disclosing the information."°6 Furthermore, by prohibiting both
private and governmental interceptions, the express language of the statute

also rejects Murdock's narrow interpretation of Gelbard.'°

Unless a

specific statutory provision excepts a particular interception, all willful
interceptions are prohibited by Title 1I.10

B. Murdock's Reliance on Underhill and Baranek
After dismissing the Vest decision for an alleged misreading of the
Gelbardholding, the Murdock court turned to United States v. Underhill"°
and United States v. Baranek"0 to further justify its clean hands excep-

tion."

In Underhill, the defendants were indicted for conspiracy and

various substantive offenses related to the ownership and operation of an
illegal gambling enterprise."' In the course of this gambling enterprise, the
defendants recorded all conversations in which bets were exchanged.113 The

United States sought to introduce those recordings into evidence.1 4 The
defendants successfully argued at the trial level that they made the recordings "for the purpose of committing a criminal act.""' As a result, the
district court granted the defendants' motion to suppress the recordings on
the grounds that the recordings were illegally intercepted." 6

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered whether a defendant who
makes an illegal interception is entitled to suppress the contents of the inter106. Id.
107. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1994); supra note 3 (providing full text of § 2511(1)).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).
109. 813 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1987).
110. 903 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1990).
111. United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1401-02 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S.Ct. 1672 (1996).
112. United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 107 (6th Cir. 1987).
113. Id.at 108.
114. Id.at 107.
115. Id.at 108. Because the appellees were parties to the recording, the recording was
likely to be exempted from Title M restrictions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). See
supra note 29 (discussing private one-party consent exception). However, if the appellees
could prove that they made the recording for any criminal or tortious purpose, the recordings would once again be deemed illegal, and as a result, any disclosure of the contents of
the recording would be illegal under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)
(1994). Consequently, appellees could then contend that § 2515 required suppression of the
contents of the interception because disclosure of the contents would be"in violation of Title
M. Id.§ 2515.
116. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 108.
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ception as improper evidence pursuant to § 2515. "1 Underhill illegally
intercepted the communications that the Government sought to use in its
prosecution. 1 Under § 2511, the Government's subsequent. disclosure of
Underhill's illegally intercepted communications would violate Title I1.19
Consequently, the plain language of § 2515 required suppression of Underhill's illegal recording. " Therefore, in order to deny Underhill's suppression motion, the Sixth Circuit had to justify straying from the plain language
of Title III.121
The Sixth Circuit began with the premise that courts must ordinarily
treat the plain language of a legislative act as conclusive."1 However, the
court limited that general rule by asserting that the intent of Congress controls judicial interpretation of a statute.'-3 Therefore, the court reasoned that
a judicial holding that is contrary to the plain meaning of a statute is justified
when the literal application of the statute will produce a result clearly at odds
with the intentions of Congress. 24 After establishing this methodology, the
Sixth Circuit considered the application of Title III to Mr. Underhill." The
court, referencing Gelbard v. United States," 6 explained that the desire to
protect individual privacy overrode congressional intent in enacting Title
Ill.127 The Sixth Circuit reasoned, however, that the general purpose of
protecting the privacy of those who use oral and wire communication would
not be served by permitting Underhill, the perpetrator of the illegal interception, to invoke Title III's suppression provision. 11 The Underhill court
9 The court based
concluded that Title I protects victims, not perpetrators. 12
13
0
this conclusion on a waiver of privacy theory.
Although Title III protects
117. Id.at 107.
118. Id.at 108.
119.

18 U.S.C. § 2511.

120. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 108-09.
121. Id. at 111.
122. Id.
123. Id.

124. Id. (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982)); see
United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 542-44 (1940).
125. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112.
126. 408 U.S. 41 (1972); see supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text (discussing facts
and holding of Gelbard).
127. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112; see supra notes 24-25 (explaining privacy interest in
Title M's legislative history).
128. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 112.

129. Id.
130. Id.
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an individual's privacy against other interceptors of her conversations, the
individual waives her privacy interest in her oral and wire communications
by recording them herself."' According to the Sixth Circuit, Underhill thus
waived any right of privacy in his communications when he recorded the
gambling exchanges himself.'32 Based on Underhill's waiver of Title III
privacy protection, the court concluded that Underhill could not invoke
§ 2515 to suppress the contents of the recorded communications despite the
fact that the communications were illegally intercepted under a literal interpretation of Title I.133
In Murdock, the Sixth Circuit found Underhill particularly useful
because, by forbidding perpetrators of Title III from invoking the § 2515
suppression protection, the exclusionary provisions of Title III do not absolutely bar all illegal recordings.114 However, although Underhill clearly
created a judicially fashioned exception to the plain language of § 2515,
Underhill cannot by its own force justify the clean hands exception fostered
by the Murdock decision. In Murdock, unlike Underhill, the person against
whom the illegal recording was offered was the victim and not the perpetrator of the recording. 35 Underhill expressly drew a distinction between the
perpetrator and victim of an illegal interception. 36 Underhill's conclusion
turned primarily upon the waiver of the Title III privacy right that occurred
when the perpetrator purposefully recorded himself. ,1 In contrast to Underhill, the Murdock court found there was no waiver of a privacy right in the
intercepted communication because Mr. Murdock did not record the conversations between himself and the dairy company.' 31 Therefore, the dispositive
factor in Underhill - a privacy right waiver - did not exist in Murdock.
The Murdock court recognized this significant distinction'39 and looked
to United States v. Baranek'4 to justify its clean hands exception. 4 ' In
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1402 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1672 (1996); see supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text (discussing how Underhill court strayed from plain meaning of Title III).
135. Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1402.
136. United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 112 (6th Cir. 1987).
137. Id.
138. See Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1392-93 (stating that Mrs. Murdock made illegal
recording given to government prosecution).

139. Id. at 1402.
140. 903 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1990).
141. United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1402 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
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Baranek, government agents obtained a Title III order authorizing the interception of telephonic communications at the residence of co-defendant
Patricia Borch.142 On one occasion, Borch, after completing a telephone
conversation, failed to hang up the telephone receiver, and the line remained
open. 43 As a result, the agents were able to hear nontelephonic conversations within the interior of Borch's residence for a two-hour period.'"
During this two-hour period, defendants Borch and Baranek made statements
that implicated them in a variety of drug offenses. 45 After listening to the
recordings, the grand jury returned a sixty-two count indictment. "
The Title Ill order under which the agents were operating only authorized the agents to .intercept wire communications. 47
1 By statutory definition,
wire communications are transfers of information that contain the human
voice at any point between the point of origin and the point of reception,
including the point of origin and the point of reception. 1 The district court
concluded that the nontelephonic conversations of the defendants were not
wire communications. "I As a result, the agents' surveillance exceeded the
scope of the Title III order. 0 Consequently, the district court held that the
agents' disregard of the limitations set forth within the wiretap authorization
order warranted suppression under § 2515. '1
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision to
suppress.' 52 However, the Sixth Circuit did not create an exception to
§ 2515 suppression'in reversing the lower court."s Rather, the court
analogized to the "plain view" doctrine within Fourth Amendment jurispruS. Ct. 1672 (1996).
142. United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1069 (6th Cir. 1990).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(1), 2510(18) (1994)). Section 2510(1) defines a
"wire communication" essentially as an "aural transfer... between the point of origin and
the point of reception.
... 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994). Section 2510(18) defines an
"aural transfer" as "a transfer containing the human voice at any point between and including the point of origin and the point of reception." Id. § 2510(18).
148. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1).
149. United States v. Borch, 695 F. Supp. 898, 901 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
150. Id. at 902.
151. Id. at 902-03 (citing United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 1972)).
152. Baranek, 903 F.2d at 1072.
153. See id. at 1069-72 (concluding that intercepted nontelephonic communications fell
within agents' "plain hearing" rather than being violation of Title III authorization order).
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dence and found that the agents' actions did not even violate Title III." s
However, unlike the Underhill court, 5 the Baranek court provided little
justification for departing from the plain meaning of § 2515.156 Generally,
courts invoke the plain view doctrine when law enforcement agents, while
in the course of an independently justified search, come across unexpected,
criminally incriminating evidence. s" The plain view doctrine serves to
extend the prior search justification to the inadvertently found item.15 8 In
other words, the plain view doctrine cloaks the unexpectedly discovered item
with the justification of the initial intrusion in such a manner that the seizure
of the found item does not require a new warrant to comport with the Fourth
Amendment.15 9 By analogy to the plain view doctrine, the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that Borch's negligence in failing to replace the telephone receiver
properly placed the criminally incriminating conversation between Borch and
Baranek in the "plain hearing" of the government agents. 1" Similar to a
Fourth Amendment search warrant, the Title Ill authorization order provided
the agents with prior justification to listen to the defendants' telephone
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 122-33 (discussing Underhill's justification for departing from
plain meaning of § 2515).
156. See Baranek, 903 F.2d at 1070-72 (referencing only unusual fact pattern and
statutory silence to justify court's departure from § 2515's plain meaning).
157. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 736-40 (1983) (summarizing plain view
doctrine); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-71 (1971) (outlining plain view
doctrine, which was designed to deal with inadvertent discoveries); see also Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 137-42 (1990) (holding that inadvertence is no longer required
for discovery of item to fall within plain view doctrine). In Horton, the Court explained the
plain view test:
What the "plain-view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of
them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine
serves to supplement the prior justification - whether it be a warrant for another
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason
for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused - and
permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.
Id. at 135-36 (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465-66).
158. Horton, 496 U.S. at 135-36.
159. See id. at 141-42 (concluding that officer's discovery of robbery weapons, even
though not inadvertent, did not violate Fourth Amendment because officer had valid warrant
to search for robbery proceeds).
160. United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1071-72 (6th Cir. 1990).
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lines. 161 Consequently, the Sixth Circuit concluded that § 2515 did not
warrant suppression of the incriminating conversation. Based on the court's
creative analogy to the plain view doctrine, no unlawful wire interception had
occurred within the meaning of Title rI.' 62 To oversimplify the situation, the
Government "got a lucky break.""163
The Murdock court adopted Baranek's "lucky break" remark in an effort
to legitimize its clean hands exception. 164 The Murdock court contended that,
like the agents in Baranek, the agents in Murdock were passive, innocent
recipients of information.165 However, a significant distinction between Baranek and Murdock exists. In Baranek, the court did not simply conclude that
because the Government received a lucky break it was entitled to the information. 1" Rather, the court reasoned that the recording in question was not
an unlawful interception and, as a result, the court never reached the § 2515
suppression question. 167 In contrast, the Murdock facts concemed the Government's use of an illegal interception. 161 Yes, the Government received a
lucky break when the competing dairy company delivered the tapes; however, that transaction did nothing to change the illegal status of the recordings. The Murdock court did not attempt to reason that Mrs. Murdock's
recordings of her husband's conversation were somehow legal. 169 Instead,
and in direct contrast to the Baranek approach, the Murdock court carved out
an exception to § 2515 suppression that created a clear Title III violation. 170
C. Murdock's Analogy to Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The legislative history of Title III states that § 2515 is not intended
"generally to press the scope of the suppression role beyond present search
and seizure law." 171 Relying upon this expression of legislative intent, the
Murdock court imported Fourth Amendment exclusionary jurisprudence into
161. Id. at 1071.
162. Id. at 1072.
163. Id.
164. See United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1402 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[a]s
in Baranek, the government here got 'a lucky break"'), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1672 (1996).

165. Id.
166. See United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1070-72 (6th Cir. 1990) (analogizing

Baranek situation to Fourth Amendment plain view doctrine to find no violation of Title ll
authorization order).

167. Id.
168. Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1393.

169. Id. at 1401-04.
170. Id. at 1404.
171. S.RP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2185.
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its interpretation of § 2515. 72 In addition, the Sixth Circuit sought further
support for its decision to invoke Fourth Amendment theory from Scott v.
United States." In Scott, the Supreme Court refused to extend Title III's
suppression provision beyond current Fourth Amendment exclusionary
jurisprudence. 74 The Scott defendants argued that the intercepting government agents' subjective disregard of Title III's minimization requirement' 75

172. United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1402 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1672 (1996).
173. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
174. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978). In Scott, the Supreme
Court considered whether lower courts should undertake a subjective or objective assessment
of government agent conduct when deciding if the minimization requirement of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(5) has been followed. Id. at 130-31. In Scott, the district court granted the government agents authorization to intercept the communications of the defendants. Id. The
contents of the recorded communications led to the arrest of the defendants for narcoticsrelated charges. Id. at 132. Under § 2518(5) of Title III, the wiretap authorization required
that the agents conduct the interceptions "in such a way as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception under [Title III]." Id. at 130. Contending that the agents violated this minimization requirement, the defendants moved to
suppress the recordings. Id. at 132. The district court agreed and suppressed the recordings. Id. The district court noted that the agents recorded almost all of the defendants'
conversations and that only 40% of them related to narcotics. Id. The court of appeals
rejected the district court's statistically-based decision and reversed and remanded the case.
Id. The court of appeals ordered the district court to assess the "reasonableness of the
agents' attempts to minimize in light of the purpose of the wiretap and the information
available to the agents at the time of interception." Id. at 132-33. On remand, the district
court suppressed the recordings again and found that the agents knew of the minimization
order and did not subjectively intend to minimize their interceptions in accordance with Title
II. Id. at 133. The court of appeals reversed again and concluded that the reasonableness
of the actual interceptions, not the subjective intent of the agents, must ultimately decide the
suppression motion. Id. at 134. Instead of remanding the case to the district court, the
court of appeals denied the suppression motion and explained that the agents' conduct was
entirely reasonable. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. Id. at 142. The
Supreme Court rejected the defendants' argument that the agents' failure to make good faith
efforts to minimize their interceptions violated the minimization requirement of § 2518(5).
Id. at 138. The Supreme Court emphasized that § 2518 contains no express "good faith"
language. Id. The Supreme Court then imported the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
employed by the court of appeals and concluded that an objective reasonableness standard
should govern the review of the agents' conduct. Id. In interpreting Title III, the Supreme
Court primarily relied upon the statement from Title IIl's legislative history that § 2515, the
suppression provision, was not intended "generally to press the scope of the suppression role
beyond present search and seizure law." Id. at 139.
175. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1994). This provision provides in relevant part that
"[e]very order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to
intercept... shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under [Title In]." Id.
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amounted to a Title III violation warranting § 2515 suppression.176 However,
§ 2518(5) lacked an express subjective good faith requiremenL
Therefore,
the Scott defendants argued that the Supreme Court should extend the
§ 2518(5) minimization mandate beyond the express language of the provision to include a good faith requirement.1 78 The Supreme Court looked
beyond the express language of § 2518(5) in search of a standard to apply to
alleged violations of the minimization requirement, but it nonetheless rejected
the defendants' subjective good faith argument. 179 Instead, the Scott Court
imported and applied the Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness test to
the agents' conduct. 11
Although the Murdock court properly cited the Scott opinion as a
situation in which the Supreme Court refused to extend Title III suppression
beyond the scope of Fourth Amendment suppression,"'8 the Scott decision
does not squarely support the adoption of a clean hands exception to Title III.
In Scott, the Supreme Court turned to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
because § 2518(5) was silent as to the appropriate test for evaluating compliance with the minimization requirement. " In contrast, § 2515 quite clearly
states that any oral or wire interception obtained in violation of Title III will
be suppressed following a motion from a person who meets the standing
requirements.l8 Thus, to the extent that a literal reading of § 2515 provides
an answer to the problem of the government as an innocent recipient of
illegally obtained information, the Scott Court's decision to import Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence provides little assistance to the Murdock court.
However, because precedent shows that § 2515 suppression is not absolute, '1
the Murdock court chose to craft the clean hands issue into a question unanswerable by the express language of the statute. As a result, the Scott
decision provides persuasive authority to leave the confines of Title III and
176. Scott, 436 U.S. at 137.
177. See supra note 175 (providing relevant text of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5)).

178. Scott, 436 U.S. at 138.
179. Id. at 139.
180. Id. at 138.
181. See id. at 139 (explaining that legislative history of § 2515 shows that Title lI's
exclusionary rule was not intended "generally to press the scope of the suppression role
beyond present search and seizure law" (citing S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprintedin
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112)).
182. Id. at 138.
183. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (providing full text of § 2515 and
explaining standing requirements to move for suppression).
184. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing Caron decision); supra notes
112-33 and accompanying text (discussing Underhill court's holding and reasoning).
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venture into the realm of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. After characterizing the Murdock issue as unanswerable by the plain language of the statute
and thereby gaining admission to Fourth Amendment theory via Scott, the
Sixth Circuit turned to a discussion of the relationship between private party
searches and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule."~ The Murdock
court decided to examine that particular body of Fourth Amendment law
because Mrs. Murdock, a private party, had illegally intercepted the telephone recordings that the Government wanted to introduce in prosecuting
Mr. Murdock's bribery charge."86 Part IV.C.1 of this Note describes the
treatment of private searches under the Fourth Amendment and the relationship between a private search and a subsequent governmental search.
1. The Exclusionary Rule and Private Searches
In Weeks v. United States,"s the Supreme Court held that items seized
by federal agents in violation of the Fourth Amendment should be excluded
from evidence at trial.' In Burdeau v. McDowell,"9 the Supreme Court
reasoned that this Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule limits the government only, and as a result, evidence obtained by a private illegal search need
not be excluded from a criminal trial."9° In Burdeau, the United States
185. United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1403 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1672 (1996).
186. Id. at 1392-93, 1403.
187. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
188. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that lower court
committed reversible error by allowing into evidence papers and property seized in violation
of Fourth Amendment). In Weeks, the Supreme Court considered whether it was reversible
error for the trial court to admit evidence that had been obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 389. Authorities suspected that Mr. Weeks had been illegally transporting lottery tickets in interstate commerce. Id. at 386. After finding a spare key, police
searched Weeks's home without a warrant, seized various papers and articles, and turned
them over to a U.S. Marshal. Id. Later, without a warrant, the U.S. Marshal returned to
Weeks's home, searched it, and seized other items. Id. Weeks petitioned the trial court to
order the U.S. Marshal to return the seized items. d. at 387. The trial court ordered the
return of all property not relevant to the charge against the defendant. d. at 388. At trial,
the Government introduced the relevant items that had been seized from Weeks's residence
and obtained a guilty verdict. d. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the U.S.
Marshal violated the Fourth Amendment when he searched Weeks's home without a warrant
and, as a result, held that the U.S. Marshal should have returned all the seized items upon
Weeks's petition for return. d. at 398. Consequently, the Court ruled that the trial court
should not have admitted the wrongly seized items into evidence and reversed Weeks's
conviction. Id.

189. 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
190. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921) (concluding that private
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charged J.C. McDowell with fraudulent use of the mails.191 Prior to trial,
nongovernment private investigators drilled into McDowell's private safe and
desk and stole certain books, papers, and other personal materials."9 McDowell objected to the United States's intention to present this privately
seized evidence to the grand jury. 193 The Supreme Court rejected McDowell's claim and concluded that the Government, having received the
incriminating evidence without violating McDowell's Fourth Amendment
search does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections). In Burdeau, the Supreme Court
considered whether the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule operates to bar the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by a private illegal theft. Id. at 475-76. Private
parties completely unrelated to the government illegally entered defendant McDowell's
office, searched his desk and safes, and seized many of his personal papers. Id. at 471-72.
These private parties turned the seized papers over to the federal prosecutor, and the
prosecutor charged McDowell with mail fraud. Id. at 470. McDowell petitioned the trial
court to order the federal prosecutor to return the stolen items. Id. at 471. The court
impounded and sealed the papers for 10 days, after which time the court clerk was to
deliver the papers to McDowell's attorney. Id. The prosecution appealed the court's
order, and the court impounded the documents through the completion of the appeal. Id.
On appeal, McDowell argued that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the United States from
presenting this illegally seized evidence to the grand jury. Id. The Supreme Court held
that the Fourth Amendment only protects individuals against unlawful government conduct.
Id. at 475. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the prosecution could present the stolen
property to the grand jury because it had in no way acted unlawfully in obtaining the
evidence. Id. To the Burdeau Court, McDowell's sole remedy lay in pursuing individual
remedies against the perpetrators of the theft. Id.; see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.8, at 173 (2d ed. 1987)
(providing comprehensive discussion of exclusionary rule and private searches). LaFave
explains:
[Tihe exclusionary rule would not likely deter the private searcher, who is often
motivated by reasons independent of a desire to secure criminal conviction and
who seldom engages in searches upon a sufficiently regular basis to be affected
by the exclusionary sanction. As for another explanation sometimes given for
the exclusionary rule, namely, that the government should not profit from its
own wrongdoing, it quite obviously has no application where the wrongdoing
was private in nature. Finally, there is the "imperative of judicial integrity" . ..
whereby courts are not to become "accomplices" in violation of the
[Constitution by admitting evidence and thus legitimizing the conduct which
produced it. It arguably is of some relevance in the private search context,
although it would seem that where the conduct in question is by private individuals rather than the police "the courts do not, by using this evidence, condone the
actions of the individual."
Id. at 176-77 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) and citing State v.
Rice, 516 P.2d 1222 (1973)).
191. Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 470.
192. Id. at 473.
193. Id. at 470-71.
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rights, could offer McDowell's property to the grand jury."9 Virtually all
courts continue to follow the Burdeau rule."9
When applying the Burdeau rule, courts have often dealt with litigants

challenging the extent to which the government may warrantlessly re-examine
items that have already been seized and studied by private individuals. In
Walter v. United States196 and United States v. Jacobsen,1 the Supreme Court
considered this question. In Walter, a private interstate shipper erroneously
delivered a dozen cartons of motion pictures to L'Eggs Products, Inc.198 The
labels on the cartons indicated that the films contained obscene homosexual
sex acts."9 One L'Eggs employee opened the cartons.'
He then attempted
without success to view portions of one of the films by holding it up to the

194. Id. at 475. The Burdeau Court explained:
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and
seizures, and as shown in the previous cases, its protection applies to governmental
action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon
the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon
other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation
of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure
by process duly issued.
In the present case the record clearly shows that no official of the Federal
Government had anything to do with the wrongful seizure of the petitioner's
property, or any knowledge thereof until several months after the property had
been taken from him ....
It is manifest that there was no invasion of the security
afforded by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure, as
whatever wrong was done was the act of individuals in taking the property of
another. A portion of the property so taken and held was turned over to the
prosecuting officers of the Federal Government. We assume that petitioner has an
unquestionable right of redress against those who illegally and wrongfully took his
private property under the circumstances herein disclosed, but with such remedies
we are not now concerned.
Id.
195. See, e.g., United States v. Mithun, 933 F.2d 631, 634 (8th Cir. 1991) (permitting
Government to use evidence seized by hotel employees who searched car parked on hotel
ramp); Parette v. State, 786 S.W.2d 817, 819-20 (Ark. 1990) (allowing prosecution to use
as evidence husband's marijuana taken by wife from home); Pruitt v. State 373 S.E.2d 192,
196-97 (Ga. 1988) (permitting into evidence bloody shirt of defendant taken from defendant's home by private searchers of missing child); Williams v. State, 364 S.E.2d 569, 570
(Ga. 1988) (allowing into evidence bullet removed from defendant by hospital employees).
196. 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
197. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
198. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 651 (1980).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 652.
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light. 2 1 Shortly thereafter, the L'Eggs company contacted the FBI, and the
agency picked up the cartons.' Without making any effort to obtain consent
from the sender of the packages and without a warrant, the FBI agents
viewed the films.' °3 Based on the contents of the films, the defendants were
indicted on obscenity charges and subsequently convicted. 0 Although there
was no majority opinion, a plurality of the Court agreed that the appropriate
analysis of a government search which follows on the heels of a private one
was whether the subsequent government search significantly expanded the
scope of the private search. 2 5 Following a private search, the fruits of a
warrantless government search that extends beyond the original private
search will be suppressed.' ° In Walter, the Court ultimately determined that
the trial judge should have suppressed the contents of the films because the
FBI agents exceeded the scope of the prior private search without first
obtaining a warrant.0 7
In Jacobsen, the Supreme Court answered the question that Walter
implicitly answered in the affirmative, that is, whether government agents
free to do later all of what was done earlier by the private party. In
Jacobsen, a Federal Express employee opened a damaged package and found
several plastic bags of white powder inside a closed ten-inch tube wrapped
in several layers of crumpled newspaper. 8 After observing the plastic bags,
the employee informed his manager and together they contacted the Drug En201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 657. The Walter plurality reasoned:
If a properly authorized official search is limited by the particular terms of
its authorization, at least the same kind of strict limitation must be applied to any
official use of a private party's invasion of another person's privacy. Even though
some circumstances - for example, if the results of the private search are in plain
view when the materials are turned over to the Government - may justify the
Government's reexamination of the materials, surely the Government may not
exceed the scope of the private search unless it has the right to make an independent search. In these cases, the private party had not actually viewed the films.
Prior to the Government screening, one could only draw inferences about what was
on the films. The projection of the films was a significant expansion of the search
that had been conducted previously by a private party and therefore must be
characterized as a separate search.

Id.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984).
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forcement Agency (DEA). 9 However, before the DEA agents arrived, the
Federal Express representatives replaced the plastic bags and restored the
package to its original unopened condition.210 When the DEA agents arrived,
they reopened the package and performed a drug field test without a warrant. 2 1' The trial court denied the defendants' motion to suppress the evidence derived from the DEA agents' search, and the defendants were convicted on drug-related offenses.212 Applying the Walter standard for evaluating the relationship between a private search and a subsequent government
search,2" 3 the Jacobsen Court concluded that the DEA agents' search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because the agents' reopening of the tube did
not provide any further information than that already made available by the
Federal Express employees. 214 For the Jacobsen Court, the Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities infringe on an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy that has not been frustrated already by a private
party.21 5 As for the field drug test, the Court found no Fourth Amendment
violation.2 6 According to the Court, the defendants held no legitimate privacy interest in their possession of an illegal narcotic.2 7 Because the field
test could only reveal the presence of specific contraband material - extremely limited information - the drug test was deemed reasonable.2 8
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.at 112.
212. Id.
213. See supra note 205 (explaining Walter Court's method for analyzing relationship
between private search and subsequent governmental search).
214. Jacobsen,466 U.S. at 119. The Supreme Court concluded:
Even if the white powder was not itself in "plain view" because it was still enclosed in so many containers and covered with papers, there was a virtual certainty
that nothing else of significance was in the package and that a manual inspection
of the tube and its contents would not tell him anything more than he already had
been told. Respondents do not dispute that the Government could utilize the
Federal Express employees' testimony concerning the contents of the package. If
that is the case, it hardly infringed respondents' privacy for the agents to reexamine
the contents of the open package by brushing aside a crumpled newspaper and
picking up the tube. The advantage the Government gained thereby was merely
avoiding the risk of a flaw in the employees' recollection, rather than in further
infringing respondents' privacy.
Id. at 118-19.
215. Id. at 117.
216. Id. at 123.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 124.
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2. A Critique of Murdock's Analogy to "PrivateSearch" Jurisprudence
Other than statutory silence and reliance on Scott v. United States,2" 9 the
Sixth Circuit provided no justification for importing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence to create a clean hands exception.'2 Nevertheless, the Murdock court, relying on Jacobsen'sarticulation of the private search exception,
concluded that the state could use the tapes illegally recorded by Mrs.
Murdock in its prosecution of Mr. Murdock." The Sixth Circuit summarily
reasoned that the government played no part in Mrs. Murdock's private
unlawful interception, and as a result, the court allowed the tapes in evidence.2mHowever, the Sixth Circuit did not precisely compare and apply the
facts, rationale, and holding of Jacobsen to the facts of Murdock and, therefore, overlooked the fact that the analogy between Jacobsen and Murdock is
far from perfect. As referenced above, the Sixth Circuit disposed of Mr.
Murdock's appeal because of the simple fact that the communications at issue
in Murdock were intercepted by a private party unrelated to. government
agents.' z By imagining Murdock in the absence of Title III, and then comparing that conceptualization to Murdock in the context of Title III, the flaw
in the Sixth Circuit's analogy to private search jurisprudence becomes clear.
If the government had intercepted and recorded Mr. Murdock's conversations with the dairy company in the absence of Title III, this action would
Consequently, the governhave constituted a Fourth Amendment search.'
ment would have had to obtain a warrant before commencing the wiretap.'
However, if Mrs. Murdock had recorded Mr. Murdock's communications
independently, her invasion would not have equaled a Fourth Amendment
search.' u Therefore, under Jacobsen, because Mr. Murdock's privacy
219. 436 U.S. 128 (1978); see supra notes 173-85 and accompanying text (discussing
Murdock's reliance on Scott).
220. United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1400-04 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1672 (1996).
221. Id. at 1403.
222. Id. at 1404.
223. Id.
224. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that use of listening
and recording device attached to outside of public telephone booth constitutes Fourth
Amendment search and requires warrant prior to commencement); see also supra notes
19-23 and accompanying text (describing evolution of Supreme Court treatment of wiretaps).
225. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (holding that use of listening and recording device
attached to outside of public telephone booth constitutes Fourth Amendment search and
requires warrant prior to commencement).
226. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921) (concluding that private
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interest in the contents of his conversation with the dairy company had been
frustrated already by a private party unrelated to the government, subsequent
listening to the tapes by the government could not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search.'
Consequently, the prosecution could play the tapes
absent a warrant without fear of an evidentiary sanction at trial.'
In contrast to Jacobsen, under Title III the issue no longer revolves

around what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. Rather, the central
issue becomes whether the oral or wire communication was illegally inter-

cepted.J 9 To be sure, evidence illegally obtained by a private party can fit

within the Fourth Amendment private search exception. 3 However, the
reason courts do not exclude even illegal private searches is because the
Fourth Amendment only regulates governmental conduct.3 1 In contrast, the
scope of Title ITregulation expressly covers private conduct.?3 2 In essence,
Title III dramatically increased the level of protection an individual retains
in the privacy of wire and oral communications. Prior to Title III, under
Katz and Berger, the law only protected the individual against governmental
invasions of wire and oral communications. 3 However, Title III's exclusionary rule, which expressly suppresses both private and governmental illegal interceptions, goes beyond the ordinary Fourth Amendment protection
searches cannot violate Fourth Amendment); see also supra notes 187-215 and accompanying text (explaining relationship between private- searches and Fourth Amendment).
227. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (concluding that Fourth
Amendment is only implicated if authorities use information with respect to which individual's expectation of privacy has not been frustrated already); see also supranotes 208-18
and accompanying text (discussing rationale of Jacobsen decision).
228. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117.
229. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1994). Section 2515 excludes from evidence all interceptions
obtained in violation of Title I. Id.; see supra note 4 (providing full text of § 2515).
230. See Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 475-76 (holding that prosecution could offer in evidence
incriminating items obtained by private illegal theft because government was in no way connected with private conduct); United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1319 (2d Cir. 1994)
(concluding that government agent's mere reading of papers stolen by private parties from
defendant attorney's office without government participation was not itself government
search violative of attorney's Fourth Amendment rights).
231. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (stating that "[tihis Court has also consistently
construed [Fourth Amendment] protection as proscribing only governmental action").
232. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1). Section 2511(1) criminalizes all interceptions of wire and
oral communications unless expressly excepted within the statute. Id.; see supra note 3
(providing full text of § 2511(1)).
233. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (showing that Katz and Berger only
restrict government conduct); supra note 14 and accompanying text (explaining that § 605
of FCA did not protect individual against private interceptions because private parties could
ignore FCA restriction without fear of prosecution).
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referenced in Katz, Berger, and Jacobsen.3 4 Thus, contrary to Murdock's
analysis, the fact that the government was using a privately intercepted
recording is by no means dispositive of the suppression issue. 35
V. A Critique of the DeterrenceArgument
Despite the flaws in much of Murdock's reasoning, there remains a
persuasive deterrence-based 6 argument for adopting a clean hands exception. 37 Congress enacted Title Im not only to protect the privacy of an individual's wire and oral communications, but also to equip law enforcement
officers with an essential tool to fight organized crime. 8 To accomplish this
234. See United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 481 (1st Cir. 1987) (concluding that
analogy to Fourth Amendment private search doctrine is improper because legislative intent
of Title III was to protect individual privacy against both private invasions and governmental
intrusions). The Vest court explained:
The government argues that we should read into section 2515 the exception to the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule for evidence falling into the government's hands
after a private search and seizure. But the fourth amendment exclusionary rule is a
judicially-fashioned rule serving different purposes than the congressionally-created rule
of section 2515 - a rule that we are here limited to interpreting rather than modifying.
We agree with the district court that to hold that section 2515 allows the government's
use of unlawfully intercepted communications where the government was not the
procurer "would eviscerate the statutory protection of privacy from intrusion by illegal
private interception." The protection of privacy from invasion by illegal private
interception as well as unauthorized governmental interception plainly "play[s] a central
role in the statutory scheme."
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 528 (1974)).
235. Id.
236. See LAFAVE, supra note 190, § 1.8, at 173 (explaining that primary purpose of
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is to deter future unconstitutional conduct); see also
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (stressing that major thrust of exclusionary rule is
deterrence); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965) (stating that exclusion of
illegally seized evidence is "based on the necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal police
action"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (emphasizing deterrent effect of
exclusionary rule); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (concluding that purpose
of exclusionary rule is to "prevent, not to repair"). Under Title Im,the government would
argue that the purpose of the § 2515 exclusion is to deter the Title Im violator from making
future unlawful interceptions by denying the violator the ability to benefit from the fruits of
illegal interceptions. Consequently, the government would contend that exclusion serves no
deterrent effect when the party moving for the admission of illegally intercepted communications has not actually violated Title M. See Vest, 813 F.2d at 480-81 (explaining government's argument that suppression when government is innocent recipient of illegal interception
does not deter future illegal government surveillance).
237. See United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1402 (6th Cir. 1995) (alluding to
deterrence-based argument), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1672 (1996).
238. See supra note 26 (explaining law enforcement purpose of Title MI).
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policy goal, Title III enumerates the crimes for which law enforcement
agents may employ electronic surveillance as a means of investigation. 239 In
addition, agents must follow the specific procedural requirement of providing
a detailed written statement to a federal judge bf competent jurisdiction to

obtain a Title III authorization order to intercept.2

Provided that the alleged

illegal conduct fits within the exclusive list of crimes susceptible to Title III
surveillance and provided that the agents have obtained a legitimate authorization order, government-intercepted communications will withstand a § 2515
suppression motion."24 In other words, similar to the administration of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,242 a court will generally only punish
the government with the suppression sanction when the government has violated a particular provision of Title III and the court wishes to deter the government from similar future misconduct.243 The legislative history of § 2515
suggests that this deterrence-based interpretation of the Title III exclusionary
rule is plausible. 2' Relying upon this understanding of Title III's exclu239. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1994).
240. Id. §§ 2516, 2518; see United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 508 (1974)
(concluding that failure to follow application guidelines for obtaining authorization under
§ 2516 and § 2518 results in suppression under § 2515).
241. 18 U.S.C. § 2515. Absent a Title m violation, § 2515 will not exclude an oral or
wire interception. 1d.; see supra note 4 (providing full text of § 2515).
242. See supranote 236 and accompanying text (explaining that primary purpose of Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule is to deter future unconstitutional conduct).
243. See Giordano, 416 U.S. at 508 (excluding intercepted communications in order to
deter government from not following Title ll's authorization requirements during future
surveillance).
244. See S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2185
(stating that § 2515 exclusion is not intended "generally to press the scope of the suppression
role beyond present search and seizure law"). This statement of legislative intent makes plausible the conclusion that § 2515 exclusion was intended to have the same deterrent effect as suppression under the Fourth Amendment. See also 1 CARR, supra note 13, § 6.3. Carr explains:
The utility of deterrence in the context of electronic surveillance should not be
overlooked when suppression is being considered for a violation of Title Ell. Eavesdropping involves "calculated institutional policy [and] ...official decision." Unlike the
random, unexpected, and unpredictable street encounter or the search warrant obtained
and executed in haste, court-ordered electronic surveillance usually involves planning and
preparation by trained or experienced agents in a context of ongoing agency and judicial
supervision. The uncontrollable factors which cause the exclusionary rule to have
dubious restraining impact on the street are normally not found with the acquisition and
execution of eavesdropping orders. On the contrary,from the initial decision to proceed
through completed surveillance, eavesdropping appears uniquely and highly susceptible
to the controlling influence of deterrence.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 203 (1969) (Fortas,
J.,
concurring and dissenting)).
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sionary rule, the United States can persuasively argue that a court should not
suppress the contents of an illegal private interception offered by an innocent
recipient because suppression will only deter a disclosing party if the disclosing party has perpetrated an original Title III violation. 245
In both Vest' and Murdock,247 the United States employed this Fourth
Amendment deterrence-based approach to § 2515 enforcement and contended
that courts should not punish the government for the illegal interceptions of
an unrelated nongovernmental party."4s In Murdock, the Sixth Circuit embraced the Government's position and concluded that Title III only protects
the individual against the perpetrator's, not the innocent recipient's, subsequent disclosure of the illegally obtained information.24 9 According to the
Murdock court, the individual has no remedy against the government when
the government seeks to introduce illegal private interceptions.'° Instead,
the Sixth Circuit concluded that the victim may only obtain redress from the
actual perpetrator of the illegal interception. 251
However, the plain language of § 2515 and § 2511(1) indicates that the
drafters of Title III intended that § 2515 suppression deter not only the perpetrator's disclosure of illegal interceptions, but also any innocent recipient's
disclosure of illegal interceptions. Section 2515 suppresses the contents of
any wire or oral communication when the disclosure of that communication
245. See United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 480 (1st Cir. 1987) (explaining Government's argument that courts should invoke suppression sanction only against perpetrator of
Title I violation). The Vest court stated: "Specifically, the government argues, the purpose
of section 2515 is to deter violations of Title m's other provisions, and it would be pointless
to apply section 2515 against the government where, as here, the government is the innocent
recipient, rather than the guilty interceptor, of an illegally intercepted communication." Id.
246. See id. (explaining Government's argument that courts should invoke suppression
,sanction only against perpetrator of Title 11 violation).
247. See United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1402 (6th Cir. 1995) (discussing
Government's deterrence-based argument), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1672 (1996).
248. See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 2156, 2185 (stating that "[t]he perpetrator must be
denied the fruits of his unlawful actions in civil and criminal proceedings" and that § 2515
exclusion is not intended "generally to press the scope of the suppression role beyond
present search and seizure law"). Read together, these two statements of legislative intent
make it plausible (1) that § 2515 exclusion was intended to have the same deterrent effect
as suppression under the Fourth Amendment and (2) that courts should invoke § 2515
deterrence only against the "perpetrator" of the Title Imviolation.
249. Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1403; see supra note 248 (demonstrating plausibility of Sixth
Circuit's assertion).
250. Murdock, 63 F.3d at 1404.
251. See id. (stating that victim's only remedy is against perpetrator and lies in bringing
civil action under 18 U.S.C. § 2520, which permits aggrieved persons to bring civil suits
against Title M violators); see also supra note 31 (discussing operation of § 2520).
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would be in violation of Title III.2 Section 2511(1)(c) states that the disclosure of an intercepted wire or oral communication violates Title III when
the disclosing party knows or has reason to know that the communication
was obtained in violation of Title III.' Thus, even if the government is an
innocent recipient of illegally recorded communications, if the government
is aware or should be aware of the recording's illegal status, then disclosure
Consequently, the plain language of § 2515 does not
violates Title fII.
protect the prosecution with clean hands against suppression.2 5
Therefore, to avoid suppression, the government as innocent recipient
of illegally recorded communications must go beyond the plain meaning of
26
Title I. As referenced above, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
supports the government's argument that only the Title III violator should
suffer the § 2515 evidentiary sanction.3 However, for the government to
successfully supplant the plain meaning of § 2515 with the more limited
Fourth Amendment deterrence theory, the government must independently
justify importing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence into this particular
question of Title III interpretation."~
Although the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Underhill 9 did not
address whether reference to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary doctrine
was appropriate in Title III cases, the Underhill decision was the only Title
III ruling to present a workable standard for determining when a court should
In Underhill, the Sixth Circuit
abandon the literal meaning of the statute.'
252. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1994); see supra note 4 (providing full text of § 2515); see also
supra note 33 (explaining that § 2515 essentially operates to suppress all illegal interceptions).
253. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1); see supra note 3 (providing full text of § 2511(1).
254. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1).
255. Id.
256. See supra note 236 and accompanying text (explaining that primary purpose of

Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is to deter perpetrator's future unconstitutional conduct).
257. See supra notes 236-45 and accompanying text (explaining that Fourth Amendment
deterrence doctrine supports Government's position that only perpetrator should suffer
Title mI evidentiary sanction).
258. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524 (1974) (stating in dicta that when
considering role of § 2515 suppression, courts should if possible defer to provisions of Title
HI rather than to judicially fashioned exclusionary rules aimed at deterring violations of
Fourth Amendment); United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 111 (6th Cir. 1987) (legitimizing departure from plain language of Title I1).

259. 813 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1987); see supra notes 112-33 and accompanying text
(discussing facts and holding of Underhill).
260. See Underhill, 813 F.2d at 111 (explaining that plain meaning of statute should be
conclusive unless "the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds
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concluded that a court should discard the plain meaning of a Title III provision only when its literal application "produce[s] a result demonstrably at
odds with the intentions of its drafters.""26 For the Underhill court, allowing
the perpetrator of an illegal interception to invoke § 2515 suppression in
order to shield himself from his own recorded criminally incriminating statements produced a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of Title
III's drafters. 62
Applying Underhill's test, the question becomes whether permitting a
victim of an illegal interception to bar an innocent recipient's introduction of
that illegal recording into evidence produces a result demonstrably at odds
with the intentions of the Title III drafters. Because granting the victim's
motion to suppress in such circumstances does not thwart Title III's dual
purposes of privacy protection and law enforcement, 3 courts should adopt
a literal interpretation of § 2515. The goal of privacy protection guided
policymakers when enacting Title II.2 4 By prohibiting the disclosure of
illegally intercepted communications, ' Title III recognized that an invasion
of privacy does not cease with the interception, but continues with subsequent disclosures.' Before Murdock, the only exception to this general rule
occurred when the individual waived her privacy interest by recording
herself.267 Barring the innocent recipient's disclosure of illegally intercepted
information further protects the privacy of the victim and, therefore, produces a result clearly consistent with Title III's goal of safeguarding
privacy.2 1 In essence, Title III's policy objective of privacy protection

with the intentions of its drafters"). But cf. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 524 (reasoning that
interpretations of § 2515 should "not turn on the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed
at deterring violations of the Fourth Amendment rights, but upon the provisions of Title II").
261. Underhill, 813 F.2d at 111 (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S.
564, 571 (1982)).

262. Id. at 112.
263. See supra notes 24-26 (explaining legislative intent behind Title I).
264. See supra notes 24-25 (describing Title M's goal of protecting privacy).
265. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (1994); see supra note 3 (providing full text of
§ 2511 (1)(c)).
266. See United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 481 (1st Cir. 1987) (reasoning that "an
invasion of privacy is not over when an interception occurs, but is compounded by disclosure
in court or elsewhere"); see also In re Motion to Unseal Elec. Surveillance Evidence, 990
F.2d 1015, 1019-20 (8th Cir. 1993) (denying civil RICO litigants' motion to unseal undisclosed government electronic surveillance due to overriding privacy concern of Title Im).
267. See United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 112 (6th Cir. 1987) (concluding that
defendant waived privacy right to telephone conversations by recording himself and therefore forfeited right to invoke § 2515 suppression).
268. See supra notes 24-25 (discussing Title mI's goal of protecting privacy).
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requires courts to interpret § 2515 as a deterrent both to the perpetrator's
disclosure of illegal interceptions and to the innocent recipient's disclosure
of illegal interceptions.
Although Congress intended that Title III equip law enforcement agents
with a weapon essential to the war against organized crime, 9 Congress
carefully outlined the situations in which officers could use Title III's form
of electronic surveillance to enforce the law. First, agents may employ Title
I surveillance only for certain crimes.270 Second, agents must always obtain
judicial authorization."71 Neither Title III's express language nor its legislative history suggests that Congress intended for Title III law enforcement to
occur through illegal private interceptions. 2' To the contrary, Congress
banned all private interceptions unless the interceptor is a party to the
conversation.273 Because Title III did not intend to combat organized crime
through private illegal wire interceptions, granting the victim's motion to
suppress a private illegal interception, even though offered by an innocent
recipient, does not thwart Title III's law enforcement purpose. Therefore,
the plain meaning of Title III, which requires the suppression of private
illegal interceptions even when offered by an innocent recipient, does not
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters of
Title III.274 As a result, according to Underhill, there is no justification to
depart from the plain language of § 2515.275

269. See supra note 26 (explaining that Congress intended to equip law enforcement

agents with weapon to fight organized crime).
270. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (enumerating exclusive list of crimes that agents may
investigate with Title 1H surveillance).
271. See id. § 2518 (detailing procedure for obtaining judicial authorization to engage
in Title Ell
electronic surveillance).

272. Id. §§ 2516-2518. Sections 2516-2518 detail the method by which Title m
requires law enforcement officers to obtain intercepted communications. Id. Sections 25162518 do not apply to illegal private interceptions. Id.
273. See id. § 2511(1) (stating general ban on interception of all wire and oral interceptions); supra note 3 (providing full,text of § 2511(1)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)
(1994) (excepting situation in which interceptor is party to conversation); supra note 29
(providing full text of § 2511(2)(d)).
274. See United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 480-81 (lst Cir. 1987) (deciding not to
read clean hands exception into Title III and therefore deciding that suppression of private
illegal interception offered by Government did not produce result demonstrably at odds with

intentions of Title I's drafters).
275. See United States v. Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 111 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that
reasonably plain terms of Title ITare conclusive unless they will "produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters" (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors,
Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982))).
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In addition, courts that adopt a clean hands exception to avoid § 2515
suppression may actually produce results demonstrably at odds with the
intentions of Title III's drafters. Congress enacted Title III's suppressionprovision as well as its civil276 and criminal penalties 2' in an effort to deter
all violations of the statute.278 However, when a court operates under a clean
hands interpretation of § 2515, the court provides great incentive for private
parties to intercept the communications of their enemies illegally. 9 Although § 2515 excludes the recording if offered by the intercepting private
party,' under a clean hands exception the private party can illegally intercept and know that if she captures illicit activities of her enemy on tape, the
government may still introduce her illegal recordings in a criminal prosecution. 281 To the extent that one doubts the potential for significant increases
in illegal private interceptions, one need only look to the facts of State v.
Faford.? In Faford, Wayne C. Fields learned from his neighbor that Robert
and Lisa Faford had made disparaging remarks about him.' Angered by the
276. 18 U.S.C. § 2520.
277. Id. § 2511(1).
278. See S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2156
(explaining that Title HI's prohibition must be enforced with all appropriate sanctions
including criminal and civil penalties).
279. See Vest, 813 F.2d at 481. The Vest court stated: "We agree with the district
court that to hold that section 2515 allows the government's use of unlawfully intercepted
communications where the government was not the procurer 'would eviscerate the statutory
protection of privacy from intrusion by illegal private interception.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. Vest,. 639 F. Supp. 899, 914-15 (D. Mass. 1986)).
280. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a)-(c), 2515 (1994). Section 2511(1)(a) makes it unlawful
for a private party to intercept any wire or oral communication unless the private party is
a participant in the intercepted communication. Id. § 2511(1)(a). Section 2511(1)(c) makes
it unlawful for the private party to disclose any interception that he knows or should know
has been illegally intercepted. Id. § 2511(1)(c). Section 2515 suppresses any interception
if the disclosure of the interception would violate Title 1m. Id. § 2515. Therefore, when
the private party illegally intercepts a communication and subsequently attempts to enter that
interception in court against the victim of the interception, § 2515 operates to suppress the
illegal interception. Id.
281. United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1404 (6th Cir. 1995) (permitting
Government to introduce criminally incriminating communications that had been illegally
intercepted by private party), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1672 (1996).
282. 901 P.2d 447 (Wash. 1996).
283. See State v. Faford, 910 P.2d 447, 448 (Wash. 1996) (providing example of
private conduct that clean hands exception will encourage). In Faford, the Supreme Court
of Washington considered whether the state's wiretap statute permitted state law enforcement
agents to introduce evidence that they obtained as a result of an illegal private wire interception. Id. at 453. In 1993, the owner of a police scanner eavesdropped on several of his
neighbors and overheard cordless telephone conversations during which Robert and Lisa
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Fafords' remarks, Fields purchased a police scanner and monitored the Fafords' cordless telephone conversations "twenty-four hours a day, seven days
a week" for several months in search of any illicit activity.'
Through his
monitoring, Fields discovered that the Fafords were growing marijuana, and
he contacted the police.'
The Supreme Court of Washington applied the
state's wiretap and privacy statute and suppressed all government evidence
derived from Fields's illegal private interception."s Although the Supreme
Court of Washington provides at least persuasive authority for rejecting a
clean hands exception to Title III's suppression sanction, the Faford court's
rationale is not as noteworthy as the particular private conduct under review.
The Faford facts precisely demonstrate the kind of private behavior that the
drafters of Title III sought to eliminates and exemplify the highly intrusive
private conduct that the clean hands exception will encourage.
The quid pro quo of the plea bargaining process makes Title III's
criminal sanction a minimal deterrent because the violator may exchange her
illegal recordings for immunity from Title III prosecution. Similarly, a jury
is unlikely to award significant damages against the private citizen who
performs her civic duty by making public the crimes of another. Thus, once
courts limit Title III's suppression sanction with the clean hands exception,
courts undermine Title III's overriding purpose of privacy protection by
creating an incentive for private parties to invade their enemies' privacy
through illegal interceptions in hopes of finding incriminating information.
VI Conclusion
In United States v. Murdock, the Sixth Circuit should have suppressed
the recordings illegally intercepted by Mrs. Murdock when the Government
Faford made disparaging remarks about Wayne C. Fields, another neighbor. Id. at 448.
This eavesdropper informed Mr. Fields of the Fafords' remarks. Id. Angered by these
comments, Mr. Fields purchased his own police scanner and monitored the Fafords' cordless

telephone conversations "twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week" for several months,
listening for any hint of illicit activity. Id. Through his monitoring, Mr. Fields discovered
that the Fafords had a marijuana-growing operation in their home, and he phoned the police.
Id. Washington drug agents went to the Fafords' home, explained their basis for investigation, and obtained consent from the Fafords to search their home. Id. at 449. The Supreme
Court of Washington determined that Fields's scanning of the Fafords' cordless telephone
conversations violated the Washington wiretap statute. Id. at 452. The court held that the
Fafords' consent was the result of an illegal wiretap and suppressed the fruits of the
consensual residential search. Id. at 453.
284. Id. at 448.
285. Id. "
286. Id. at 452-53.
287. See supra notes 24-25 (explaining Title HII's goal of individual privacy protection
against both private and governmental intrusions).
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attempted to introduce them during Mr. Murdock's prosecution. The prosecution knew that Mrs. Murdock had illegally intercepted her husband's conversations. 8 As a result, the prosecution's disclosure of Mrs. Murdock's
illegal interception violated Title I1.289 Section 2515 requires a court to suppress any interception if its disclosure violates Title III.21 Thus, the plain
language of § 2515 required suppression of the recordings in Murdock.29
The fact that the government played no part in Mrs. Murdock's illegal
interception is irrelevant. First, a literal interpretation of § 2515 neither
produces a result demonstrably at odds with the privacy protection objective29 nor with the law enforcement objective of Title III.' 9 Second, even
if the Sixth Circuit could justify abandoning the plain meaning of the statute
and importing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the two principal analogies
to the Fourth Amendment - private search doctrine and linmited deterrence of the guilty interceptor - fail to support a clean hands exception. 294
Moreover, Murdock's analogies to previous § 2515 exceptions do not withstand close scrutiny 295 Therefore, until Congress expressly states otherwise,
when the government attempts to introduce an illegal private interception,
courts should reject the clean hands argument, follow the plain meaning of
§ 2515, and suppress the illegal private interception.

288. United States v Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1393 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116

S. Ct. 1672 (1996).
289 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (1994) (making it unlawful for any party to disclose
wire or oral interception if party knows or should know that interception was obtained m
violation of Title II).
290. Id. § 2515; see supra note 4 (providing full text of § 2515).

291.

18 U.S.C. § 2515.

292. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (discussing Title I's goal of privacy

protection); supra note 274 and accompanying text (stating that suppression of illegal private
interception offered by Government would not produce results demonstrably at odds with
intentions of Title II's framers).
293. See supra notes 263-75 and accompanying text (reasoning that suppression of
illegal private interception offered by Government will not produce result demonstrably at
odds with law enforcement purposes of Title ID).
294. See supra notes 219-35 and accompanying text (demonstrating flaw in Murdock's
analogy to Fourth Amendment private search doctrine); supra notes 236-87 and accompanying text (explaining that, unlike Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, § 2515 must not only
deter perpetrator from disclosing illegal interception, but also deter innocent recipient from
disclosing illegal interception).
295. See supra notes 112-33 and accompanying text (explaining why Underhilldoes not
support Murdock's clean hands exception); supra notes 140-70 and accompanying text
(reasoning that Baranek does not support Murdock's clean hands exception).

